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Abstract
Saudi Arabia and Iran are two of the most influential countries in the Middle East. They
have often clashed with each other for a number of reasons. Although Riyadh and Tehran
frequently espouse their sectarian differences as an explanation and justification for their
regional confrontations, sectarianism is only one variable of the complex relationship between
the two countries. Therefore the main question for this research concerns the non-sectarian
sources of contention between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the ways in which Saudi and Iranian
leaderships frame this confrontation around sectarianism. As the first step, using constructivist
framework, this paper analyzes the social and historical construction of Saudi Arabia and Iran to
understand the main reasons for their confrontation in terms of sectarian differences and
beyond. Based on a close examination of Saudi and Iranian history and contemporary policies,
the paper then uses the examples of proxy wars in Bahrain and Yemen after the Arab Spring
to focus on the contemporary geopolitical strategies of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia and
Iran have opposing political discourses; the Saudis tend to use realpolitik while the Iranians often
base decisions on ideological considerations. Findings from this research suggest that events like
the Arab Spring Revolutions have deeply intimidated Saudi Arabia. As a result, the country has
implemented aggressive policies they perceive to be defensive in order to prevent Iranian
aggression and subversion. Saudis now routinely disparage Shia movements and parties who are
seen as representing Iran. On the other hand Iran, in its efforts to unite all Muslims against
imperialist forces, continues to condemn the Saudis as lackeys of American imperialism. Thus
the confrontation between the two nations has three dimensions: sectarianism, a quest for
regional hegemony, and international alignments.
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Executive Summary
This essay examines the power dynamics in the Middle East by looking at the relations
between the two hegemonic powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Religion matters as a foundation of
power for both countries, with Saudi Arabia as the home of Mecca and Medina, and Iran as the
home of the modern Islamic revolution. Iran chooses its battles based on geopolitical gains,
whereas Saudi Arabia decides based on who defends or challenges its international influence.
The following paper argues that conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran does reflect their
divergent religious beliefs, but above all, it is a case of converging power struggles and strategic
geopolitical interests. Coupling examinations of sectarian perspectives with examinations of
national strategic interests sheds light on the rationale of both of these motivations. While
sectarianism is not the sole stimulus of political action and inaction, sectarianism allows for
“othering,” and can be used by chauvinistic actors to divert hostilities and build on a collective
sentiment. Overall, the goal of this project is to identify the competing religious-political
ideologies of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two dominating powers in the Middle East. This
examination of power dynamics illustrates Middle Eastern and international trends and
illuminates various foreign and domestic strategies that have been used by Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
Although the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran and their battle for Islamic
hegemony is more complex than their Sunni-Shia differences, it cannot be properly understood
without this sectarian component. This paper begins with a historical examination of the origins
of the Islamic sectarian division between Sunnis and Shias, followed by a deconstruction of the
frequently referenced “1,400 year war” between the two. This historical analysis creates the
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setting in which a thorough understanding of the religious and political relations between Saudi
Arabia and Iran can be explored.
This research asks, what are the non-sectarian sources of contention between Saudi
Arabia and Iran? And in what ways do Saudi and Iranian leaders frame sectarianism? The
dependent variable is the current confrontation and dispute between these two nations.
Sectarianism and national strategic interests are two independent variables. Although
sectarianism is an important consideration, this research argues that converging power struggles
and competing strategic geopolitical interests play a larger role in Saudi-Iranian relations. This
research examines Saudi-Iranian relations through adopting a constructivist worldview, with the
ultimate goal of gaining a better understanding of the forces that guide action and inaction in the
Middle East. It analyzes contemporary political shifts through the study of state, ulema, and
media rhetoric that have sometimes amplified and sometimes reduced systemized Sunni and Shia
social and economic disadvantages. In addition, this research explores changes in Saudi-Iranian
public policy in relation to two distinct pivotal political events, the first being the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, and the second being the Arab Spring in 2011. This research includes a
comprehensive look at proselytization and impacts of the Iranian Revolution, as well as Saudi
Arabia and Iran’s proxy wars in Bahrain and Yemen. Although generalizations about Saudi and
Iranian actions cannot be made based solely on an examination of these two proxy wars, the
examples highlight trends in Saudi and Iranian actions that can be seen in other regional matters.
Today, Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to be in the political spotlight for different
reasons. Therefore, it is important to increase public awareness of how differing religious
sentiments are always not the root of conflict in the Middle East, but rather how sectarianism has
the ability to feed into a preexisting conflict when wrongfully wielded as a political weapon.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Since the withdrawal of direct United States presence in the Middle East and the decline
of Syrian and Egyptian hegemony after the Arab Spring, a hegemonic vacuum appeared in the
region, waiting to be filled by the next regional power. Events in recent decades show Saudi
Arabia and Iran vying for power in that vacancy, where sectarian differences are often referred to
as the polarizing culprit behind the geopolitical rivalry. However, religion more often than not
serves as a simplistic explanation or guise in government and media rhetoric. The relations of the
two countries are far more complex than their Sunni-Shia differences. However, the rivalry
cannot be properly understood without the sectarian component. In order to understand the
current power dynamics in the Middle East and Saudi-Iranian relations, we must look at and also
beyond sectarian labels, without fully dismissing the religious component. It is important to
discuss contemporary Middle Eastern politics and history from this perspective, in order to gain
insight into sectarian conflicts, while also placing it into a broader perspective of non-sectarian
conflicts. This paper argues that conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran does reflect their
divergent religious beliefs, but above all, it is a case of converging power struggles and strategic
geopolitical interests.
Saudi Arabia and Iran are not only competing for power because of their sectarian
differences. Their competition originates in Iran’s populist Theocratic-Islamic government direct
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challenges to the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s monarchy. Iran represents the “resistance” against
U.S. imperialism, and serves as an appealing model for supporters of Pan-Islamism. Saudi
Arabia is an absolute monarchy with little to no tolerance for popular demonstrations, and a
formidable voice in regional organizations. As a huge coercive force and soft-power authority,
Saudi Arabia’s influence can be particularly alluring among pious Sunni Arabs with little
democratic sympathy. Both countries have means for political brokerage from oil reserves, but
both countries have very different approaches to exhibiting their influence over the Middle East.
The research question asks what are the non-sectarian sources of contention between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and in what ways do Saudi and Iranian leaders frame this confrontation
around sectarianism. This research applies a constructivist framework by analyzing the social
and historical construction of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This worldview can help expand
understanding of contemporary Middle Eastern relations and reveal the myriad factors that
contribute to regional conflicts.
In the first chapter, I will quickly survey the origins of sectarianism and offer a
counterargument to the claims of a “1,400 year war” between Sunnis and Shias. In the second
chapter, I will examine the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, beginning with state formation, which
illuminates the amalgamation of the Saud family, ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the British. Following
this discussion, I will outline Saudi Arabia’s contemporary domestic governance and civil
society, foreign policy, the Kingdom’s stance toward Shias, and the exportation of Wahhabism.
For the third chapter, I will discuss the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, beginning in
analyzing the decline of the Imperial State of Iran from 1925 up until the Iranian Revolution in
1979. After, I will discuss contemporary Iran’s domestic governance and civil society, foreign
policy, Iranian leadership’s treatment of Sunnis, and the continued exportation of the Iranian
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Revolution philosophy, focused on Pan-Islamic ideals. These chapters show how foreign and
domestic tendencies are shaped by state formation and history. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I
will bring together the discussion on Saudi and Iranian foreign policy to analyze the countries’
interventions in Bahrain and Yemen.
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Chapter 2
Sectarianism

A discussion of the seventh-century origins of sectarianism is necessary to have in order
to better understand the sectarian cleavages that have contributed to Middle Eastern political
decision-making and societal relations.
The Prophet Muhammad died a sudden death in 632, an unexpected shock for the people
of Medina and his followers. Muhammad had served as an absolute ruler, filling roles such as
commander, military general. This made the appointment of a successor difficult because there
was no obvious second follower in power below the Prophet, nor did he have any sons. Even if
such a person had existed, many Muslims would not consider him or her justifiable, since no one
else had a direct connection to God (Armstrong 2002).
Muhammad left no instructions as to who should rule after his death. This led to much
dispute over legitimate government after the Prophet’s death and it is here that sectarian divides
began to emerge. Islam was still a new religion and the Prophet’s followers knew that the region
had to be ruled by an undivided power, or else the Islamic empire would not survive. Thus his
followers agreed that the successor of the Prophet must be one individual in order to maintain an
undivided power. One group thought that Muhammad had wanted the elite members of the
Muslim community to choose a leader, or caliph, to succeed Muhammad and for the elites to
select the caliph when the reigning caliph died. This group became known as the Sunnis.

5
Another group thought that Muhammad had believed that only God could choose the successor
to lead the Muslim world, and that in order to do so, the caliph had to be a member of
Muhammad’s family. This group would become known as the Shias.
Ali ibn Abi Talib was the Prophet’s closest male relative as Muhammad’s cousin and
son-in-law. Some Muslims believed he should rule the Islamic community, claiming that he held
Muhammad’s charisma and had unquestionable piety. Ali, however, was still very young and
lacked experience. Through a majority vote, Abu Bakr, a close companion of the Prophet and the
father of one of Muhammad’s wives, was selected to succeed Muhammad and become the first
caliph (Armstrong 2002). As newly elected ruler, Abu Bakr stated, “I am elected not because I
am the best of you… If I do my job thoroughly, follow me and help me. If I deviate from the
right path to corruption, bring me back to the right path” (Saritoprak 2014).
Shias refer to their leaders as Imams, a term that holds significance since Imams
traditionaly take on a spiritual role that no clerics in Sunni Islam hold. The centrality of the Imam
is also a fundamental difference between the two sects of Islam. Shia belief that the Imam will
lead Muslims to salvation is problematic for some Sunnis, who believe that Shias are asserting a
divine quality of certain human beings. This, Sunnis say, questions the oneness of God, and is
therefore a sin. However, the Imam holds significance for all Muslims because it represents the
conscious religious approach to politics that is evident throughout Islamic law and philosophy.
Another point of contestation about Imams has to do with belief in the twelfth Imam. Twelver
Shias believe the twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi went into occultation, and then was taken
into hiding by God to come back at the end of time, while Sunnis do not believe in this
occultation of the twelfth Imam (The Princeton Encycloppedia of Islamic Political Thought,
2013). He is known as the Mahdi, or the Messiah. Twelver Shias believe that the Prophet’s
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message and the Quranic texts will manifest with the return of the twelfth Imam. Although all
Shias are not Twelvers, they are the largest branch of Shia Islam, making up about eighty- five
percent of the Shia population.
The Sunni-Shia divide in the Muslim world today has been exacerbated by many
different events since the original question of Muhammad’s succession, but the fundamental
disputes between the two sects lie within what happened during the seventh century. Sunni
Muslims believe in the first three caliphs prior to Ali and do not believe that God chooses
caliphs. Shia Muslims on the other hand reject the first three caliphs and believe in the divinely
chosen caliphs, beginning with Ali. Despite their differences in belief of succession, both Sunni
and Shia Muslims believe that Muhammad is the final prophet, follow the five pillars of Islam,
and read the Quran as the holy book. This mutual agreement on the three fundamental aspects of
Islam has allowed Sunni and Shia Muslims to live peacefully amongst each other for long
periods of time. However, recent years have unveiled a new period of spreading conflict in the
Middle East between Sunnis and Shias. (Brumberg 2001).

Periods of sectarian peace
The differences between Sunni and Shia beliefs cannot be denied, but historically, Sunnis
and Shias have often lived peacefully amongst each other. Media and state leadership often
makes claims about the “1,400 year war” between Sunnis and Shias, but the reality is far less
rigid. The two sects have cohabitated for over a millennium. Similar to any fundamental
disagreement, this one is not without conflict, but it has existed in longer periods of pluralism
and accommodation than in animosity and vitriol. In the centuries following the founding of
Islam, the Islamic empire clashed with European Crusaders and Mongol conquerors, yet the
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religion was able to spread widely around the world. This extension of the Islamic religion along
with its resiliency could not have occurred if warring sectarian conflict was consistent
throughout history (Sachedina 2001). Conflict, between Sunnis and Shias, is a mostly recent
occurrence, the reemergence aligning with the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent political
shifts in the Middle East, particularly the Arab Spring in 2011.
Some scholars argue that the colonial subjugation of local populations and the creation or
reinvigoration of deliberate, artificial ethnic divisions, as seen in Belgian rule over Rwanda and
British rule over India, has also aggravated Sunni Shia relations (Nardone 2010). This theory
asserts that Western powers have exacerbated these divisions in order to maintain the status quo
in the Middle East, where the region is divided and thus groups are incapable of asserting
themselves. In this view, the roots of sectarian conflicts are perpetuated through inaccurate
continuities that reference a constant strife between Sunnis and Shias that has persisted to present
day. Although there seems to be a lot of sectarian conflict in recent decades, this does not mean
sectarianism has been a problem throughout history. Non-Muslims and Muslims have used
exaggerated sectarian differences to mobilize specific groups and to create disunity within
Muslim communities. This strategy of divide and conquer is not a unique tactic; creating disunity
within groups perceived to be threats to create infighting and divert efforts away from external
actors has long been a political strategy. Such narratives suggest that sectarian fighting is
inherent in Islam, and disregards how sectarianism is socially created and amplified by actors
seeking to maintain power over a divided Muslim community.
Contemporary cooperation between countries in the Middle East and inclusive
governments have existed and continue to exist in the region, despite increased regional conflicts
framed around sectarianism. Prior to the Syrian Civil War, Syria was known as “The beating
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heart of Arabism,” with its mosaic population of Sunnis, Alawites, Druze, and Christian
communities. In addition, Lebanon has created a governmental structure based on inclusive
power sharing. These two examples display how in recent history, before the impasse in Syria in
2011 and after Lebanese independence in 1948, respectively, Sunnism and Shiism were not the
driving identity forces in the Middle East. Rather, leaders emphasized Arab national identity that
facilitated peaceful relations between Arabs of all faiths. Arab unity in defense of Palestine
during the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967 also shows how Arab
countries overcame sectarian differences to work together against Israel.
Historical narratives and media naturally focus on conflicts, which represent realities for
some, but not realities for many. Such accounts do not necessarily provide an accurate depiction
of everyday life for average Muslims. This skewed exposure suggests that the Sunni-Shia
conflict is widespread, inevitable, and permanent. A more inclusive analysis presents a more
nuanced historical narrative.

Today’s emerging sectarian relations
Today, Sunni populations outnumber Shias, with Shias making up about ten to fifteen
percent of the global Muslim population. Shias, though a global minority, constitute about 80
percent of the native population of the Persian Gulf region, residing in parts of Iran, Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia in the oil rich areas (Nakash 2003).
As mentioned earlier, and as will be developed in later chapters, sectarian conflict has
reemerged recently in some parts of the Middle East. Inter-state rivalry, as seen between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, is high, and social and economic disadvantages for Sunnis in Shia countries and
Shias in Sunni countries are systemic. These domestic policies that favor one sect while
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disenfranchising the other are not due to some sort of inherent hatred between the two sects, but
rather represent a geopolitical strategy used to delegitimize opposing regional powers. Similarly,
as we will see later in the paper, Saudi Arabia and Iran do not support other Sunni or Shia
countries or movements based on their shared religious sect alone; countries will only invest
resources into countries that benefit their geopolitical interests. Sectarianism allows for
“otherness,” but is also closely tied to power, resource, and territorial interests. This discussion
on sectarianism is to give background to better understand the interactions between Saudi Arabia
and Iran in the context of their sectarian beliefs.
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Chapter 3
Saudi Arabia: The Wahhabi State

A brief overview of Saudi state formation will help support an understanding of
contemporary Saudi foreign and domestic policy. This chapter looks at the history of Saudi
Arabia’s state formation and the main actors involved in the creation of the Kingdom. Because
Wahhabism plays a key role in Saudi politics and civil society, it is important to understand how
such a controversial interpretation of Islam grew from the birth of the Kingdom, and how it has
managed to survive today. This discussion contributes to understanding Riyadh’s domestic and
foreign policies. Accordingly, this chapter also discusses the importance of Saudi Arabia’s
petrodollar economy, which funds numerous projects abroad and is used to maintain the welfare
state and add legitimacy to the Kingdom’s leadership.

Saudi State Formation
The historical formation of Saudi Arabia can be described as “an endogenous political
creation,” with roots in the 1744 pact between Najd ruler Muhammad ibn Saud and the Muslim
revivalist and fundamentalist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Menoret 2014). The Emirate of
Jabal Shammar was ruled by the House of Rashid, based in Ha’il, a wealthy northern Najd city
because of its position on the route of the Hajj and the accompanying trade market. The House of
Rashid often feuded with the House of Saud over control of the Najd region. Eventually, the
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House of Rashid fell to the House of Saud. This expansion, leading to the eventual creation of
Saudi Kingdom in 1932 from the dual monarchy of Hejaz and Nejd was possible due to the
preexisting weakness of the Rashidi rulers and Ibn Saud’s establishment of a strong religious
fighting force that spread the message of holy war. This rhetoric in turn built the foundation of
Ibn Saud’s Kingdom.
Although Wahhabism united Ibn Saud’s expansionist territorial interests with the
Ikhwan’s expansionist religious interests and the preexisting tribal structures, Wahhabist
ideology was not the main factor of durability for the Saudi Kingdom. International political
conditions at the time including the decline of the Rashidi stronghold, the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent British support of the Saud were concurrent factors of the
Saud’s success (Rasheed 1992). In addition, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to new state
formation, where most parts of the Middle East fell under British and French spheres of
influence.
The United Kingdom’s heavy influence in the formation of Saudi Arabia can explain
some of the conservative politics of the country today. Although the West is not considered a
bastion of Wahhabism, it was the British who appointed al-Wahhab as their leader in Saudi
Arabia for their own strategic interests to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Al-Wahhab was not a
man of original ideas, but rather he was a textualist. Textualism, similar to literalism emerged
during the post-Mongol period, where many people searched for a scapegoat to blame for the
destructive Mongol invasion, and landed on the lenient philosophical interpretation of Islam and
the acceptance of coexisting religions and ethnicities. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed
nothing else was needed for an Islamic state; the Holy Quran was sufficient for scholars and
government (Sindi 2014). Wahhabism as an Islamic ideology was able to overcome the lack of
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tribal cohesion of the region through administrative effectiveness and institutional organization.
It regulated zakat collection, inheritance and marriage, and established an authoritative
leadership. The fighting forces, the Ikhwan, were motivated not by payments from the newly
established ruler, but by Wahhabi doctrine, which favored territorial expansion, conquest, and
military organization that the Ikhwan fervently adopted. Ibn Saud used Wahhabism, or the
revivalist movement within the world of Islam, to legitimize his leadership over his newly
acquired territory of central Najd up to the border of Jabal Shammar, where he sought to capture
the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, Ibn Saud became King of Hejaz in 1926 and King
of Najd in 1927 (Rasheed 1992).
Although it was not the glue that kept the country afloat, a large product of Saudi
Arabia’s state formation was the creation of Wahhabism. The religion is deeply rooted in Saudi
Arabia because of its connection to the House of Saud and the inseparable bond between the two
entities. The House promotes Wahhabism and the Wahhabs give the House a sphere of
legitimacy; each could not have emerged without the other, and each is dependent on the other
(Sindi 2014). The creation of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom in 1932 put the country on track to
become a crucial world power, additionally supported by its strategic location, natural resources,
and its history of Western political and financial aid.
However, the Saud’s debt to the West has contributed to Shari’a law implementation and
proselytization, in order to domestically promote a religious narrative. This simultaneously
appears to distance the country’s politics away from Western interests, which in turn strengthens
Saudi nationalism.
The collaboration between ibn Wahhab and ibn Saud continues today in a wider
partnership between the Sunni ulema and the House of Saud, in which clerics provide the House
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of Saud with the religious legitimacy to rule. However, this relationship has slightly shifted, with
the period of modernization under the third Saudi state when King Abdulaziz Al Saud regulated
the ulema within the power structure of the Kingdom. The ulema were confined to regulating
issues concerning public morality, Sharia interpretation, designing religious education, and so
on, but were not allowed to criticize the ruling family, particularly on political matters. Despite
these limitations, it is crucial to understand that the rhetoric of the ulema remains a powerful
force, and their voices are able to reach mass audiences through outlets such as electronic media,
sermons, and prayers (Isamail 2012). Today, the Kingdom still maintains relationships with the
United Sates and the United Kingdom, in which the West usually turns a blind eye to human
rights violations in the Kingdom in exchange for intelligence and security information to protect
the U.S. and U.K. (Slawson 2015).

Contemporary Civil Society and Domestic Governance
Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain stable global relevance due to its strategic
location, control of Mecca and Medina, and its formidable oil reserves. As a geographically vast
state with a large population of approximately 29 million, surrounded by smaller and less
influential Gulf States, the Kingdom has maintained substantial political leverage in the region
(World Bank 2015). Although the country is the only Wahhabi state and thus does not share very
many religious similarities with many other Middle Eastern states, the presence of two of the
holiest Islamic sites brings an estimated 14.3 million people a year to the country, making it the
nineteenth most visited country in the world, according to the World Bank’s 2012 estimates (The
Economist 2014). It also requires that the country remain involved in the umma, or Muslim
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community; severances from the Kingdom mean severances from Muslims duty to embark on
the Hajj, or pilgrimage.
Oil plays a huge role in the Kingdom’s economy and governance. Aramco, the Saudi
Arabia’s oil company and the world’s largest oil and gas company pays a twenty percent royalty
on revenues and eighty- five percent income tax (Blas and Mahdi 2017). Saudi leadership uses oil
revenue to silence populations and maintain social order through censorship. In a country where
criticism of the government can lead to several years in jail, online platforms have become
popular spaces for freedom of expression. However, the state has strictly monitored, censored,
and filtered online voices and movements discussing taboo topics issues and a need for political
change. Numerous restrictions were imposed on cybercafés in 2009, requiring businesses to
install hidden cameras, take customers names and websites used, and prohibit minors. Women
make up over half of Saudi’s bloggers, where they can discuss topics that are prohibited in
public, such as health. Accordingly, the aid of social media and technology to organization of the
Arab Spring has also concerned Saudi leadership, where authorities have openly confirmed their
blocking of 400,000 sites (Reporters Without Boarders 2009)
Shari’a law continues to govern Saudi Arabia, where the sole constitution is an ultraconservative interpretation of the Holy Quran. Saudi Arabia is not unique in recruiting passages
from the Quran while neglecting to acknowledge other crucial passages regarding the same topic
at hand. Many other religious and political figures in other countries use this tactic. Quranic
reading is very interpretive and has caused a tendentious division amongst Muslims, and has
allowed for a puritan view of Islam to emerge and remain in Saudi Arabia. The government
seeks to appease its citizens by appearing to be more religious, when arguably Saudi law is
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imposed to allow the government to suppress its citizens in order for the House of Saud and the
Wahhabis to maintain their power.
As a result of Saudi Arabia’s Islamic government, many people in the country have been
marginalized and suppressed. Shari’a law in Saudi Arabia bans freedom of religion. Only
Wahhabis are permitted to work in the public sector, and any conversion from Wahhabism to any
other religion is punishable by death. “Saudization” is a popular notion in the country, where
anyone lacking Saudi citizenship is marginalized. However, the government restricts individuals’
right to work, and gaining citizenship in the country as a visiting worker, or finding a wellpaying job are nearly impossible, unless you are Wahhabi and have connections within the
government (Armstrong 2002). An abundance of public and private wealth is juxtaposed with
high unemployment, and social inequalities.
Saudi Arabia’s government is an absolute monarchy legitimized by ultra-conservative
religious beliefs. Ideologically, there are two versions of Wahhabism ultimately contributing to
overall instability in the country. These are the official interpretation of the Monarch and the
underground oppositional interpretations of Islam. Because of this, it is difficult to identify the
exact nature of Islamic revival in Saudi Arabia and whether or not it is a sustainable movement.
Saudi domestic durability has been established by a combination of religious and economic
factors that have also allowed the Saudis to influence politics in the region. The religious
functions of effectiveness, power, and prosperity of a Muslim state, combined with the economic
function of oil revenues that granted the government access to military weapons, have allowed
Saudi Arabia to maintain prominence in the region and the international sphere (Ochenwald
1981).
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Religion matters as a foundation of power, where Saudi Arabia holds power over the two
major shrines of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and where tribalism, kingship, and oil resources are
the three additional main sources of government power. The rentier state is not dependent on
taxes or the people; rather, as the second largest oil-exporting nation, it relies on its oil resources
to bring in government revenue. However, experts claim that Saudi oil reserves are not as large
as the Kingdom claims, and oil prices have been persistently low. In 2016, companies including
Saudi’s Binladin Group, the Middle East’s largest construction firm, had to let go of tens of
thousands of employees (Naylor 2016; Riedel 2016). Continued light flows of petrodollars and
resulting periods of austerity will likely affect the belief systems of the population. The changing
energy market will sway society toward non-oil based markets that are thought to be westerncapitalist industries, or could even “Arab Spring-like turbulence” (Naylor 2016; Alterman and
McCants 2014; Ochenwald 1981). This fragmenting social realm could be ameliorated with
policies to transform the social and economic sector by expanding the job market to ostracized
unemployed populations, but this has not been the case thusfar.
Secular nationalism, socialist materialism, and western consumerism were all rejected on
an ideological level by the ulema before the 1970s. The problem the Saudi government faced
during the twenty-first century has to do with the practical adaptation and application of these
concepts onto society. The Saudi elite perceives any manifestation of attack on the Kingdom as a
failure to preserve morality from excessive cultural imitation of the West. Specifically, the 1979
attacks on Mecca triggered a government response to give a greater place to the symbols of
Islamic identity in Saudi culture (Ochenwald 1981). Looking to the future, it is difficult to see
how the role of Islam in pubic life can be strengthened more than it has been in the past, and
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whether or not the country’s strong ultra-conservative religious identity will sustain itself
through the next generations of Saudi society.
When King Salman became king in January 2015, he immediately dismissed influential
officials who opposed Wahhabi ulema, and in turn appeased the public by making promises for
increased financial benefits. However, he continued to neglect calls for political reform. He also
appointed Muhammad bin Nayef, an anti-democratic figure as the crown prince and interior
minister who controls foreign and domestic intelligence (Choksy and Choksy 2015).

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy
Political threats, in the eyes of the Saudi government, are treated as security threats. The
country is an extremely rational world actor, thus they choose their battles based on who
supports or challenges their interests and international influence (Alternman and McCants 2014).
Once the Saudi empire began receiving funding from the British, Riyadh was able to
intervene in its neighbors’ affairs, as seen in its military intervention in Bahrain during the Arab
Spring, its consistent economic influence in Egypt, its international funding of Wahhabi and
Salafi schools of thought abroad, and its political brokerage in Yemen and Syria. This financial
backing also allows for public expenditure, which on the surface makes the government look like
it is improving, but in reality, the increased public sector salaries, monthly minimum wage, and
hiring of more civil servants and security personnel only affects people with close connections
within the exclusive government, thus neglects a large portion of the population (Menoret 2014).
The Saudi’s annual budget was an estimated $130 billion as of 2007. They used much of this
funding used to create 60,000 new jobs in the Ministry of Interior, construct 500,000 houses,
fund a number of religious organizations, and raise the minimum wage in the public sector,
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unemployment assistance, and the budget for public credit agencies (Hertog 2011). The façade
that all of Saudi civil society has access to adequate welfare in part allows Western countries,
such as the U.S., to continue to financially and militarily support the Kingdom. In turn, this aid
allows the Kingdom to pursue its interests both internationally and domestically, without regards
to protecting human rights. The interaction between the U.S and Saudi Arabia is thus a mutually
beneficial one that legitimizes both governments. This is a dangerous relationship, considering
how the Saudis are staunch followers of realpolitik; this partnership provides even more funding,
and more importantly, confidence for Riyadh to support regimes that violate human rights.
The loudest voices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, have shifted to largely
represent Saudi Arabia since the Arab Spring. Established in 1981 after the Iranian Revolution,
the coalition of six Arab Sunni oil-exporting monarchies, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman gathered together to promote economic cooperation and
defend the member states against threats. Despite its alleged intentions, the GCC was still unable
to defend Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990 without the help of American troops. The tacit
goal for the establishment of the GCC was to protect the authoritative rulers of the Gulf States
against any domestic threats, which were perceived as some of the most threatening forces, after
witnessing the fall of the Pahlavi Empire in Iran (Ayoob 2011). Therefore, as an already large
and powerful state, Saudi Arabia has managed to gain control of smaller states in the Arabian
Peninsula through the GCC, and with checkbook diplomacy to less wealthy states such as
Bahrain. Additionally, military assets after years of buying advanced weaponry from the United
States has allowed the Saudis to engage in their various proxy wars and assist other GCC
members, where they have obtained enough military assets from the U.S. and U.K., where they
are capable of carrying out their own endeavors without continued support from the West.
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Export of Wahhabism
Saudi Arabia has attempted to establish Wahhabism and Salafism as a major soft power
force in the Islamic world through education initiatives and by delegitimizing the Shias.
Examples of Wahhabi education can be seen in the students at the Islamic University of Medina,
most of whom are foreigners benefitting from scholarships, free accommodation, and plane
tickets to study a textualist interpretation of Islam. After they graduate, some are hired by the
Saudi monarchy, while others return to their countries to preach Wahhabi Islam. In building an
international Wahhabi network, the Saudis are not only proselytizing their interpretation of
Islam, but they are creating an international platform to consolidate their political agenda and
ideological influences, and to expand their network of international allies (Farquhar 2015).
Building on preexisting tensions in various Middle Eastern societies, the Saudis export
their Wahhabi education and outreach programs to challenge preexisting conditions. For
example, in the United States, according to the U.S. Congress September 11 th report, Saudi
Arabia’s elite leadership gave millions of dollars to Sunni extremists said to be Islamic charities,
both inside and outside the U.S., leading up to the attacks in 2001. In a testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, and on King Fahd’s website, the Kingdom spent four billion per
year on madrassas, mosques, preachers, students, and textbooks to spread Wahhabi teachings
over the next decades. This funding contributed to thousands of Islamic centers in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, some of which do not train scholars, but jihadis (Choksy and Choksy 2015). King
Fahd’s website claims the funding is used to support charities and trusts, “recruiting students to
more than 1,500 mosques, 210 Muslim centers, 202 Islamic colleges, and 2,000 madrassas and
on staffing those institutions with nearly 4,000 preachers and missionaries in non-Muslim
nations in central, southern, and southeast Asia, as well as in Africa, Europe, and North
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America” (Ibid). In addition, Wahhabis control four-fifths of the global Islamic publishing
houses, which allows the Saudis to spread their version of Islam to regions with or without an
established madrassa. According to a report by Freedom House these publications have been
found in the U.S., and spread messages of intolerance toward Jews and Christians, and labels
Americans as the “abode of the infidel” (Freedom House 2005: 11).
On the one hand, the Arab Spring removed from power many of Riyadh’s allies
throughout the region, but on the other hand, in some cases, with the former dictators of the
Middle East being overruled, Wahhabi pockets have been able to further establish themselves
without fear of persecution, especially where Wahhabi texts and teachings match those of the
Islamic State. This foreign policy plan to export Wahhabism abroad has largely backfired on the
Kingdom, since the Islamic State has become a considerable international and national security
threat, and other Sunni regimes have recently fell, creating a possible collapse of Riyadh’s
regional network.

Shia treatment in Saudi Arabia
Although a minority of the Saudi population, Shias in the Kingdom make up ten to fifteen
percent of the population (Pew Research Center 2009). Despite prince Salman, now King
Salman’s statements in 2007 to U.S. Ambassador James Oberwetter claiming, “the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia does not have problems with other creeds or sects,” discrimination and persecution
of Shias in Saudi Arabia is evident in anti-Shia clerical rhetoric. This hatred toward Shias is
rooted in Wahhabism, as well. When ibn Abd al-Wahhab visited Barsa, he found Shia tombs to
be too excessive and declared the sect to be corrupt (Ismail 2012). In the early periods of the
third Saudi state, the ulema declared the Shia degenerative, but not a political concern. They
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rather needed guidance towards the correct theological path (Raihan). However, with the threat
of the Iranian Revolution, Saudis have taken greater efforts to marginalize Shia populations
domestically and abroad. This oscillation in the Saudi stance toward Shias shows how any
abhorrence to Shias does not have to do with differences in Sunni and Shia beliefs, but rather is
in concurrence with political events. In a 2014 interview with a Shia activist in Riyadh, the Saudi
national claimed that the government deliberately redirects Sunni anger at the royal family
towards Shias (Alterman and McCants 2014).
The January 2016 execution of Sheikh Nimr al Nimr, a prominent Shiite cleric,
exemplifies Riyadh’s reactionary response to political anxieties that diverts attention toward
animosity towards Shias. Before Nimr, the Kingdom had not executed such an important Shia
figure in many years. Riyadh later cut ties with Iran and expelled all Iranian diplomats from the
country. Although the weaknesses in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq create an atmosphere where the
Saudis hold much control over regional matters, recent events such as the crisis in Syria and the
Iran nuclear deal make the Kingdom feel vulnerable, resulting in erratic foreign policy of the
aggressive new leadership. Accordingly drawing attention to anti-Shiism diverts attention away
from the Kingdom’s failed proxy wars, and further legitimizes the Kingdom’s self-proclaimed
role as the leader of Sunni regional order (Lynch 2016). The various structural shifts in the
region, resulting in continuous anti-Shia rhetoric, have become more difficult to dilute within
civil society, especially with young Arabs who have been exposed to much sectarian violence in
the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In November 1979 in Qatif, Saudis gathered to demonstrate against the Kingdom.
Although the protests were inspired in part by the Iranian Revolution, it was not exclusively
sectarian; frustrations partly derived from disaffected Shias, and were also deeply rooted in
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historical provincial discrimination in Qatif, where citizens called for Riyadh to take
responsibility for failing to deliver on promises to modernize the neglected and deteriorating
Eastern province (Jones 2006). Although Shias in the Eastern province make up about thirty
percent of the population, state neglect has impacted both Sunnis and Shias, where the eastern
citizens do not have much input into municipal budgets or administration of the province. This
leads to spatial marginalization that has been further exacerbated by sectarian marginalization
(Wehrey 2013).
The protests began in al-Qatif with a celebration of Ashura, to celebrate the death of
Imam Hussein. The actions spread to neighboring villages and some on the streets also protested
against the Saudi Regime, holding signs with anti-Saudi slogans and images of Ayatollah
Khomeini. The National Guard, at the advice of the ulema, met the combined celebrations and
protests with deadly clashes. Although the first day of the seven days of Qatif protests were
initiated and dominated by Shias, the subsequent protests presented in a more complex
demographic makeup. As violence erupted at the hands of the National Guard, protests attracted
a wider congregation who were both appalled by the brutal state response, and felt a shared
communal anger from years of state neglect and poor social conditions (Jones 2006). Following
the protests and violence in Qatif, in order to remain in control of the Shia populations and the
country, the ulema also began disseminating anti-Shia materials that targeted Saudi Shias, Iran,
and various Shia religious doctrines.
Since 1990 Saudi Shia resistance has stagnated for the most part, but the ulema remains
suspicious of Shia populations, particularly those in the Eastern province. In 1993, Sheikh Nassar
al-‘Omar wrote the treatise Waqi’ al-Rafidah fi Balad al-Tawhid, translating to “The Reality of
Rafidah in the land of Tawhid”, arguing that the Shia have exaggerated their population size in
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the Kingdom. He went further, claiming that Shias are liars, untrustworthy, and plotting schemes
against the Sunnis of the country. Other Saudi ulema often reference this 1993 treatise in attacks
on the Saudi Shia. Sheikh al’Omar’s treatise claims that Shia education in Saudi Arabia’s
Eastern Province allows Shia girls to receive education. The government funds most of the
schools, thus allowing for Shias to infiltrate the labor market and gain economic advantage,
particularly with Aramco and governmental departments. Although only a handful of Sunni
ulemas are strongly anti-Shia, the visceral opinions on the matter is indistinguishable from the
established clerics because the ulemas do not criticize those within their government (Ismail
2012).
Saudi foreign policy has distinctive characteristics that have developed and emerged from
regional political shifts that have threatened the preexisting identity of the Kingdom. Prior to the
Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia portrayed itself as the single legitimate leader of the Islamic
world. After 1979, however, the Kingdom had to adopt a staunch Sunni self-identity to remain
distinct from Iran, while maintaining political brokerage in the region and appearing as the more
authentic leader of the Islamic world. With the rise of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in
2012, which toppled a previous Saudi ally and challenged the Kingdom’s claims to be the ruler
of Sunnis, the Kingdom faced yet another identity crisis and reformed its international role as the
champion of the Salafi-Wahhabi school of thought, thus countering the Muslim Brotherhood’s
claims of representing the Sunni Islamic world. These two distinct political shifts in the Middle
East eroded Saudi distinctiveness, leading to increased conservatism in the Kingdom, as well as
further programs to proselytize Wahhabism abroad (Darwich 2016). Sectarianism for Saudi
Arabia was enhanced as a tool to establish a distinct narrative for the Kingdom in order to secure
the country’s dominant presence in the region.
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Chapter 4
Iran: The Shia State

Iran has a fascinating contemporary history due to its transformation from a constitutional
monarchy to a theocratic republic during the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and its unique Persian
ethnicity, surrounded by Arab states. Due to its unique characteristics, Iran is perceived as a
threat by many Middle Eastern governments, which has shaped their foreign and domestic
policies. Iran today features a leadership that still longs for the country to be the leader of the
Pan-Islamic world, and so externally the country tries to diminish sectarian divides and draw a
collective-Islamic enmity towards America and other Western powers. This chapter will examine
Iran, beginning with an analysis of the reasons for the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini.
Next, the chapter will discuss domestic governance and civil society in Iran, followed by the
country’s foreign policy, which has remained consistent since the Iranian Revolution. This
chapter will also study the systematic discrimination against Sunnis in Iran and Iran’s attempts to
export its revolutionary ideals abroad.

State Formation of Iran
Iran has a unique political culture and identity that is heavily influenced by a pre-Islamic
philosophy of Persian nationalism. Due to its Persian heritage and its practice of Shiism, the
country is prone to hostilities in the region and has been forced to maintain a skeptical and
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selective foreign policy, predominately motivated by ideological, rather than economic or
geopolitical reasons (Boroujerdi 2014; Sariolghalam 2014). Iranian foreign policy prioritizes
regime security, involving the country consistently attempting to reinforce its legitimacy,
sovereignty, and security in the state (Sariolghalam 2013).
In 1921, the military officer Reza Khan, or later Reza Shah claimed kingship. He
modernized the economy and secularized politics with the goal of emulating Kemal Ataturk’s
reforms. He applied alterations to education by creating modern schooling systems and the
Iranian Academy of Literature with the goal of purging the Persian language of foreign,
particularly Arabic influences (Bashiriyeh 2016, “Social Cleavages”). Additionally, he adopted a
French judicial system, which challenged the religious establishment’s influence on the legal
system through Islamic law. A disbeliever of democratic institutions, Reza Shah admired
efficient governments administered by a top down structure, including that of Nazi Germany,
with which he sympathized. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Shah allowed German
specialists and consultants into Iran, which the Allied powers interpreted as a sign of German
influence over Iran (Ekran 2010). For this reason, in 1941, the British forced Reza Shah into
abdication and his son Mohammad gained control of the throne and ruled up until the revolution,
implementing authoritarian modernization, similar to his father, and an extremely pro-Western
foreign policy (Long 1980). The consequences of Reza Shah’s pro-German sympathies
continued to emerge during World War II and after. USSR troops did not withdraw their troops
from Iran in 1945, violating their 1942 treaty to evacuate U.S., U.K., and Soviet troops six
months after the war ended (Ekran 2010).
Mohammad Shah inherited a fracturing regime that the people considered illegitimate.
The regime lacked dedicated popular support because it was seen as a byproduct of American
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and British imperialism. To add fuel to fire, Mohammad Shah continued to neglect rural
populations and kept a stagnant economy. In 1978, a journalist recalls meeting Mohammad Shah,
and the Shah’s refusal to acknowledge that there were any slums in Southern Tehran, despite the
approximate one to two million inhabitants there (Halliday 1979). Rather than spend public
funds on improving Iranian lives, Tehran delineated a huge proportion of the budget to
purchasing arms from the U.S. According to the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, the U.S. was the largest arms exporter to Iran from 1950
to 1970 (SIPRI 2017). The SAVAK, or the Iranian Organization of Intelligence and National
Security, was ubiquitous in daily life, and the common use of torture as an interrogation tactic
was public knowledge (Halliday 1979). The Shah’s denial of this well-known information, his
negligence toward rural communities, his partnership with the U.S., and the great deal of internal
corruption left Iranians filled with frustration.
During Mohammad Shah’s rule, Iran experienced rapid modernization, in which the oil
economy increased from $550 million in 1964 to $20 billion in 1974 (Boroujerdi 2014). The
hurried transformation from an agrarian society to a rentier state applied tremendous pressure on
the economic system and state government. Although the Shah tried to create a dynamic and
open political system, the government failed to apply this to all social classes. Rapid
modernization fostered a sense of political deprivation and dependence on the Western world.
The accelerated economic change then eroded state and civil society relations (DeFronzo 2015).
Two key factors largely contributed to domestic unrest and demand for governmental
reformation, both of which show the consequences of political dictatorship, international
alignments, and sporadic economic development. The first was the economic discontent due to
the rise and decline of the economy, combined with the Shah’s compromise of Islam in
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government, leading to widespread cultural unhappiness. Initially, the country experienced a
10% decline in oil prices in the late 70s, followed by a 20% rise in consumer prices (Bashiriyeh
2015, “Science of Revolutions”). This later capitalization on Iran’s formidable oil reserves
produced too much revenue from one sector, thus making the entire economy vulnerable and
discouraging other businesses from developing or expanding. Simulta neously the 1970s brought
an influx of over 60,000 well-paid foreign technicians into the country, creating a labor shortage
and aggravating agricultural problems. The failure of domestic agricultural to keep up with the
rise in population and food prices on the world market exacerbated an already frustrated Iranian
civil society (Cecolin 2016). The revolutionary crisis occurred when the economy experienced a
period of improvement and rising expectations, followed by a sudden decline, thus giving way to
widespread public disappointment (Bashiriyeh 2015, “Science of Revolutions”).
Secondly, the Shah’s attempts to undermine the public importance of Islam and center
Iranian identity on Persian nationality instead of religion was a large contributor to the religious
ideology of the revolution. His banishment of organized political opposition received harsh
criticism from the U.S., claiming it was in violation of human rights and led the U.S. to pressure
the Shah to lift the restraints on political opposition. The Shah’s indecisive and shifting policy on
political opposition backfired on him when he gave the previously restrained revolutionary force
space to organize the opposition movement around the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini (Armstrong
2002). From 1965-1975 there were signs of increasing Islamisation of Iranian society, such as
the creation of twenty-six exclusively religious publishing houses, an increase in veil wearing,
and an increased number of Islamic societies at universities. Yet despite these increases, there
were no drastic shifts toward Islamisation (Ramzani 1986).
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The downfall of the Shah shows how the motivating factors behind the Iranian
Revolution were derived from a mass of sectarian divisions, but rather from a combination of
social factors. Accordingly, Ayatollah Khomeini had great charisma power and the ability to
mobilize people to action.

1979: The Iranian Revolution
The Iranian Revolution, or the Islamic Revolution was noteworthy for being the first
contemporary revolution that led to a theocracy. All other modern revolutions have fought
against merging church and state. It was also the only modern social revolution where guerrillas
and peasants played a marginal role; people from all walks of life were drawn to the
revolutionary message. However, it is still often referred to as a “cataclysmic event,” because
although the revolution was domestically successful, it was seen as an illegitimate claim to
power by most elites of the Islamic world.
Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian religious and political leader, possessed a unique ability
to organize and unite a wide spectrum of political and social forces. For the intelligentsia,
Khomeini represented a nationalist opposed to foreign imperialism and domestic fascism. For the
Bazaars, or the middle class, Khomeini represented an opposition to the Shah dictatorship and
hindrance to ownership of private property and traditional values. To the urban worker,
Khomeini was a man of the people and a deliverer of social justice and income redistribution.
Finally, to the rural masses, Khomeini brought the promise of infrastructure, development, and
access to water and electricity (Abrahamian 1982). The Islamic ideology of the Iranian
Revolution was the indispensable mobilizing force behind the massive demonstration of public
discontent with the Shah’s regime. It gave a voice to the common miseries of a people who felt
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systematically marginalized (Dabashi 2006). His message resonated with such a wide range of
Iranians precisely because Shiism meant different things to different people, all of whom disliked
conditions under the Shah. Clerics advocating strongly for the revolution argued that Shiism
served as a revolutionary ideology that justified the struggle and promised an improved future for
all the masses.
The revolutionary coalition consisted of the urban poor who experienced an intense
cultural chasm between tradition and modernity, the moderate middle classes who were
concerned with political freedoms, the clergy, the leftist opposition including Marxists, and the
Bazaars. By the start of demonstrations in 1978 and 1979, the state already lost a significant
capacity to repress the resistance. Soon, a reality of dual sovereignty emerged, in which the Shah
continued to rule some areas, while the opposition captured other areas (Bashiriyeh 2015, “The
Revolution in Iran”).
By January 1979, the Shah fled the country and Khomeini returned, later officially
coming to power through elections and declaring Iran an Islamic state. The new constitution
promoted political power and legitimacy derived from above, through God, and below, through
the people, while purposefully disenfranchising many religious minorities in the country in
efforts to keep the Shias in the position of power (Menoret 2014).
During the formative period, the clergy rushed to advance their power and institutionalize
the revolution. They transformed the monarchy to an Islamic republic in terms of its constitution,
law, parliament, political systems, and revolutionary committees. Secondly, they purged Iran’s
schools and universities, the police, military, and government ministries of opposition voices and
re-staffed them with supporters of the regime. The legacy of these policies remains today and is
evident in the education system, which continues to impress Islamic values and support for an
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Islamic state on its students (Menoret 2014). Due to the rapid period of modernization Iran
experienced throughout the twentieth century, the transformation of Shia religious law into a
modern state constitution required some modifications. The constitution had to extend Shia
religious law beyond ethics and customs covering public law, and also necessitated the creation
of a legislation that extended beyond the activities of conventional scholar jurists activities
(Arjomand 2009). Khomeini was not interested in being a part of the constitutional drafting
process, and so he left the job to his inner circle. This disinterest is reflected in his statement in
1970, claiming, “if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need for you,
after establishing government, to sit down and draw up laws, or, like rulers who worship
foreigners and are infatuate with the West, run after others to borrow their laws” (Arjomand
2009: 26).
Iran’s history and dramatic changes in regime are instrumental to understanding modern
Iran, including why the country feels threatened by the international community, including its
regional neighbors, and why it feels it is necessary to export its ideologies abroad.

Contemporary Civil Society and Domestic Governance
Today, Iran is a major regional power with a strong centralized state and a large
population of over 70 million people who share a strong national religious identity. The Islamic
Republic has a theocratic government, and a political structure comprising of a supreme leader,
the executive, legislature, judiciary, and other institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and
the Expediency Discernment Council. Despite the regime’s efforts to win the hearts and minds of
the civil society, a demographic transformation and a growing distance from the negative
experience of the Shah’s previous rule and subsequent revolution has caused Iranian youths to
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gradually become more averse to the country’s current governmental structure (Menoret 2014).
Many of the unemployed masses of Iranian youths aspire to leave the country, to escape the
pervasive theocratic government, the slow rate of economic growth, and the poor education
(Mokhtari 2005; Sariolghalam 2014).
Similar to Saudi Arabia, the country has experienced social drawbacks due to the
“resource curse.” This phenomenon explains how Iran has focused on selling its natural
resources to countries such as China and India, both countries that are accelerating in the
innovative industries, while Iran’s oil-export-based economy remains stagnant (Bayat 2010).
Iran, however, does recognize that its oil resources are finite, and it would be disingenuous to
assume that Iranian leadership is not thinking of ways to transform its economy and energy
sector through new technologies, like nuclear energy (Mokhtari 2005).
The Shia state of Iran believes in the occultation of the twelfth Imam, or the last Imam,
who would be entitled to political leadership and religious authority. With this belief comes the
dilemma of authority; no government is truly legitimate until the Imam returns from hiding.
Twelver Shia belief that governmental and religious authority belongs to the Imam alone
justified the rebellion against the Shah. Although some say Shiism is more permissive than
Sunnism, because it accepts expediency as a source of Sharia law, Shia government structure in
Iran is less democratic. Shias believe that the government belongs to the prophet and his
descendants, and if his decedents are not in power, then the government is illegitimate. The rise
of Ayatollah Khomeini, referred to as Imam Khomeini by his followers, reinvigorated Shiism in
the region and thus a renewed and enforced the sectarian hegemonic divide between the Wahhabi
Saudis and the Shia Iranians.
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Iranian Foreign Policy
Iran is willing to fund radical militias in states that have weak central governments and
large Shia communities. These groups begin as militias with pro-Iranian elements and later
become influential players within national governments. Iran’s foreign policy is centralized
around ideological concerns. Iranian foreign policy has trend of supporting revolutionary groups,
or non-state actors, in order to take advantage of instability and penetrate weak states, thus
targeting dissatisfied political parties or militias who oppose domestic or regional status quo.
This is reflective of revolutionary ideology, which tends to favor justice for a cause above
economic development; politics have always won over economic concerns (Sariolghalam 2014).
The county’s oil resources have given Iran the ability to postpone economic development, thus
saving the country from having to create normalized relations with the United States, the channel
that many countries seeking to develop must follow, as seen in Turkey, Brazil, and Malaysia,
among others. Iran has a subsistence economy, where interdependence is incompatible with
independence and would undermine the identity of the Islamic Republic.
Since the Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy and ideology has remained consistent. Iran
bases its interests and policies on universalism, “or global order with an Islamic worldview that
is found within the geographic boundaries of Muslim societies” (Sariolghalam 2014: 161).
A common misconception is that Iran chooses partners based on a shared adherence to
Shia Islam. This, however, is not the case, as evident in its partnership with Hamas and the
Taliban. Both these groups were Sunni, but they strongly oppose the regional order’s status quo,
which was dominated by the U.S. and its regional allies. A main goal of Iran’s is to establish a
presence in certain geographic areas that can later serve as a platform to project Iranian
influence.
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Sunnis in Iran
After 1979, Khomeini was not just calling to be accepted as leader of the Shia Islamic
world; he wanted to be leader of the entire modern Islamic world. He aspired toward a total
Islamic revolution, not just a Shia revolution, with the hopes that Iran would become the
vanguard of the Pan-Islamic movement. Despite this, Khomeini still used Shia popular beliefs to
rally the Shias around him, while simultaneously downplaying this pro-Shia stance outside the
country, instead elevating anti-American rhetoric in attempts to rally Sunnis. International Sunni
leadership, however, mostly did not accept his efforts. Since the Iranian Revolution, Sunnis in
Iran continue to be underrepresented and marginalized, despite President Rouhani’s undelivered
promise to grant equal rights to Sunnis and Shias.
Freedom House ranks Iran as “not free” when it comes to the state of religious freedom,
the second lowest ranking level, with Saudi Arabia as “worst of the worst” (Freedom House
2017). Compared to non-Muslim religious minorities, such as Zoroastrians and Christians,
Sunnis have greater legal protections. Human Rights Watch reports that Iranian authority
systematically discriminates against Muslim minorities, including Sunnis, by limiting their
political voice, rights to equal employment, and banning religious minorities from building
mosques in Tehran or conducting Eid prayers (Human Rights Watch 2016). Sunni identity
mostly does not share Iran’s Shia national identity, thus reducing Sunni identity to “other” in a
Shia state, and leading to even further psychological marginalization (Mohammadi 2014).
Although nationalism is discouraged in the religion of Islam, the Iranian government encourages
population growth by supporting and promoting families to have more children due to a constant
fear that Arab populations will rise against them (Bashiriyeh 2016 “Demography”).
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The U.S. State Department also noted in its annual religious-freedom report that religious
leaders banned Sunni literature and teachings from public schools, along with the construction of
Sunni mosques. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran cited activist reports
claiming that twenty Iranians were arrested in Ahvaz in February 2016 for converting from
Shiism to Sunnism. In addition, Sunnis have been executed for preaching Sunni Islam, on
charges of “enmity against God through spreading propaganda against the system” according to
Human Rights Activists News Agency. Sectarian tensions have escalated in the region and have
manifested in proxy wars, regional disputes, and executions of high-profile Shia clerics like
Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia and Sunni preachers Mohammad Kayvan Karimi, Amjad Salehi,
and Omid Payvand in Iran (Graham 2016). Such tensions only seem to suggest a more difficult
life for religious Muslim minorities in the Middle East, so long as the ruling elites view minority
populations as a political threat.

Export of the Iranian Revolution
Khomeini did not want the Iranian Revolution to remain within the borders of Iran; he
aspired for a Pan-Islamic world, with Iran as the leader. In December 1979, Khomeini
proclaimed “’Islam is not peculiar to a county, to several countries, a group, or even the
Muslims. Islam has come for humanity… Islam wishes to bring all of humanity under the
umbrella of justice’” (Ramanzi 2004: 556). Iranian leadership continues to use this rhetoric,
though regional Sunni leadership sees it as illegitimate. The Iranian leadership downplays the
country’s Shiism to countries abroad, while vilifying the U.S., often deterring blame for a
regional country’s actions on American imperialism. After the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr
in January 2016, at a protest in Tehran, in a speech Ahmad Panahian, an Iranian cleric claimed,
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“the gruesome crime was only the enforcement of an order coming from America and Israeli
intelligence services dictated to their collared dogs in Saudi Arabia” (Hubbard 2016). This vitriol
towards Western influences contrasts with the words of a protester, who said “today, the message
of this gathering and other rallies throughout the country to the Shiites of Saudi Arabia is that we
are with you and we support you’” (Ibid). The sentiments during the protest show how Iranian
leadership expresses disapproval of other Muslim nations, though they reserve the harshest
criticisms for the West in order to keep the door open to alliances with other Muslim nations in
the future. Ultimately, the creation of a Pan-Islamic movement was a failed project of
Khomeini’s, and the Iranian Revolution did not create unity amongst Muslim states, but it did
play a role in transforming Shia political stances from quietist to an ideological and sociopolitical movement against foreign influence.
The Iranian Revolution was not only transformative for Iranians; the movement’s
message was felt amongst Saudis as well, particularly in the Eastern Saudi Province, as discussed
in the previous chapter. Dissident Shia clerics such as Shaykh Hasan al-Saffar hoped that the
revolution would be an impetus for the Saudi Shia to finally defy the House of Saud (Darwich
2016). The Revolution served as the beginning of the emerging and continued power struggle
between the Saudi Monarchy and an Islamic Republic of Iran. Saudi Arabia remains a deeply
anti-revolutionary state, while Iran continues to work toward achieving a Pan-Islamism. In
addition, the Kingdom is not based on a nationalist sentiment, but rather its Textualism and
implementation of Sharia law, as interpreted by Wahhabis. Because of this, Saudi Arabia feels
threatened when its distinct identity is challenged. Previously, the Saudi royal family established
its consolidation of Islam and based its identity on its position as the vanguard of the Islamic
world. It cited the ownership of Mecca and Medina and the financial funding of a conservative
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Islamic approach. The Iranian Revolution challenged this, resulting in a contesting duality of
power.
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Chapter 5
Converged Regional Interests: Proxy wars in Bahrain and Yemen

The Middle Eastern hegemonic powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, are currently invested in
several regional interventions and proxy wars. Although some undertakings are more significant
to the interceding countries than others, no pawn in Riyadh and Tehran’s game of geopolitical
supremacy is more salient than another, in terms of analysis ; different case studies reveal or
substantiate different trends. This chapter continues to explore what the non-sectarian sources of
contention between Saudi Arabia and Iran are, and how the Saudi and Iranian leaderships frame
the confrontation around sectarianism.
The cases of Bahrain and Yemen serves the purpose of this particular paper because they
are instances of which both Riyadh and Tehran are potential benefactors, but also in which the
two countries have invested differently. In addition, these proxy wars feature Iran and Saudi
Arabia as the main actors, without as much other international influence, particularly from the
U.S., as is the case in Syria and Iraq. A comparison of the two proxy wars, and the hegemons’
roles in the conflicts, provides an interesting insight into the geopolitical strategies of Saudi
Arabia and Iran and illuminates how Saudi Arabia follows realpolitik and Iran follows
ideological considerations. The case of Bahrain shows the quick reactions from Saudi Arabia and
Iran in the chaos of the Arab Spring in 2011, when both countries had long-term strategic
interests in the region, with Saudi Arabia’s partnership with Bahraini leadership, and Iran’s
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historical ties to the country. Yemen, on the other hand, provides a case study in which Saudi
Arabia has historical ties and investments in the country, but Iran’s level of involvement is
debated, though Saudi Arabia continues to justify its involvement in Yemen as a defense against
Iranian expansion. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s proxy wars in Bahrain and Yemen are indeed a case
of divergent religious branches, but above all, it is a battle for power and strategic interests.

Bahrain
Political tensions in Bahrain do follow sectarian lines, though this is not the only
explanatory factor for the politics of the country. Roughly sixty-five to seventy-five percent of
the population is Shia, and almost one-third the population is Shia of Persian decent, a group that
the Sunni monarchy especially distrusts (Pew Research Center 2009). Despite this demographic
composition, Sunnis dominate Bahrain’s 40-seat parliament, due to an electoral process that bars
Shias. Bahrainis believe that Sunni invaders from Qatar in the eighteenth century captured and
maintained power over the original Bahraini Shias. The country has experienced periods of
violence, and repression against the politically marginalized Shia populations (Nasr 2006). The
Bahraini monarchy has recruited and granted citizenship to thousands of guest workers, typically
of Arab or Pakistani descent, in an effort to alter the sectarian balance in the nation towards a
higher Sunni population (Kuwait Times 2011). Currently, the country’s proportion of nonnationals is at 51.1 percent, according to the Gulf Labor Markets and Migration Research Center
(Gulf Research Center). This atmosphere is coupled with the systematic disenfranchisement of
Shias through exclusion from state-jobs, governmental decision-making, and housing.
Prior to the Arab Spring, violent confrontations between Shias and the Sunni monarchy
occurred with help for the leadership coming from the Saudi government who remains vigilant
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about increased Iranian influence in Bahrain. Accusations in 1981 by the Bahraini government
claimed to have discovered Iranian terrorist cells in the country. Bahrain followed with harsh
campaigns to counter domestic Shia resistance, arresting seventy-three Bahrainis and later
charging them as members of the Tehran-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (BBC
2016). Uprisings in the 1990s brought civil unrest and a subsequent violent crackdown that left
forty people dead, and arbitrarily arrested Shia religious leaders, oppositional political figures,
and human rights activists. These pieces of history are precisely why Sunni rulers suspect Iran to
be the feeding hand behind anti-regime, Shia activity in their states. However, the main
opposition parties in Bahrain do not want an Iranian vilayet-e faqih, or guardian of the jurist
government, nor do they necessarily want Shia rule; they wish for an end to the institutionalized
discrimination against Shias by elite Sunnis, and an end to sectarian gerrymandering that recruits
and gives citizenship to Sunni guest workers who often serve in Bahraini security forces and
have a greater access to the job market (Nasr 2006). Iran is arguably a marginal Shia force in
Bahrain, where Bahrainis gravitate towards the Iraqi Shia clergy, which advocates for quietism.
This philosophy calls for religious leaders to restrict their statements to moral and religious
issues, and abstain from political commentary. This strategy is espoused by Iraq’s Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who is an Iranian-born cleric, and who supports an Islamic state, but not
a theocratic state like Iran (Otterman 2004). It is against this background of systemic
disenfranchisement and schemes by Bahraini government that the Bahraini citizens were inclined
to organize and protest during the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring uprisings in Bahrain and the subsequent violent crackdown reintroduced
vitriolic clashes between Iran and Saudi Arabia, similar to Saudi Arabia’s reaction to domestic
demonstrations during and after the Iranian Revolution. Although this is one case of conflict
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between the two countries, it exemplifies both defensive and offensive strategies made by Saudi
Arabia and Iran, respectively. Saudi Arabia attempts to quell the revolution and maintain the
status quo, while Iran attempts to capitalize on the political upheaval in Bahrain in order to shift
alliances towards the Republic. Iran merging with Bahrain would create a pathway to build more
coalitions in the region, which could later serve as a gateway to harness more power in the
region. The case of Bahrain exemplifies how Riyadh supports governments and Iran supports
civilian- led uprisings. The case does follow sectarian lines, but, the problem is not inherently due
to sectarianism, but rather derives from systematized discriminatory policies against a group of
people who are seen as a political threat, in order for another group to maintain power.
With a history of economic stability along with its connection to global super powers,
Saudi Arabia is able not only to neglect human rights in its own country, but also to support
similar neglect in other countries in the Middle East. The increased amount of control over Gulf
States, or Saudi satellite regimes after the Arab Spring has given the Kingdom notable political
leverage, especially in Bahrain. Unlike other small Gulf States, the Bahraini monarchy has
welcomed Saudi financial aid and has not displayed much independence as seen in other small
but wealthy Gulf States such as Qatar.
Saudi elite backed King Hamad, stating that they stood “with all its power behind the
state and people of Bahrain” (Kuwait Times 2011). This ironic statement and the Kingdom’s
subsequent military intervention were due to a fear that successful revolutionary campaigns in
Bahrain would entice similar domestic revolutions. In addition, the Saudis claimed that the Gulf
Cooperation Council’s military forces were deployed to protect Bahrain from Iranian threats, not
as an execution of occupational power over Bahrain (Ibid). In reaction to GCC claims of Iranian
subversion in Bahrain, Ayatollah Ali Khameini in 2012 during a Friday Prayer in Tehran stated,
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“’The rulers of Bahrain claimed that Iran is involved in the events of Bahrain. This is a lie. No,
we do not interfere… if we had interfered, the conditions would have been different in Bahrain’”
(Matthiesen 2013).
Iran has a long history of attempts to extend Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain, arguing it
was a part of the Shah Abbas reign in 1588-1629, and was taken by the al-Khalifa family with
support from the United Kingdom in 1783. Iran’s Shah, beginning in 1970, revived Iran’s call for
ownership over Bahrain, which later fizzled out after the UN referendum for Bahrain’s
independence. After 1979, however, the mullah regime again revived claims for ownership over
Bahrain, with one advisor referring to the country as the fourteenth district of Iran. (Melamed
2016; Lawson 1989; Cordesman 1997). This historical claim, however, is never manifested in
actions, only rhetoric and shared sentiments. Iran’s claims to Bahrain exhibit a foundational
difference between the Saudi and Iranian leadership, where the former is action motivated, and
the latter is ideologically motivated.
Bahrain’s geographic proximity to the Kingdom along with its historical roots in the
Persian Empire makes the small island nation a center for substantial Saudi-Iranian political
conflict. The case of the Arab Spring in Bahrain can be viewed as a case of climactic sectarian
tensions, but it can more fittingly be analyzed as a geopolitical conflict between two countries
and their support for allied governmental monarchies, versus support for revolutionary masses.
The Arab Spring in 2011 toppled Saudi-allied governments across the region. The
Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power posed a threat to the Kingdom’s self-identified role as the
Sunni leader of the Islamic world. Worried that Iranians would fill the empty vacuums and
capitalize on civil unrest throughout the region, the Saudis quickly backed the governments of
their regional allies with financial and military funding. The Kingdom promised billions in aid to
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Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, and other countries for crackdowns on protesters, even going so far as to
offer Morocco and Jordan memberships to the Gulf Cooperation Council (Lynch 2011; Fisher
2016). As a revolutionary movement, which challenges the status quo, the Arab Spring was seen
as an opportune moment for Iranians to gain more partners and extend their influence in the
region.
Out of all the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East, Bahrain had the largest turnout
relative to the size of the country. During the height of Arab Spring unrest, oil-rich countries
distributed wealth to Oman and Bahrain to quell cries of social reform in the two smaller
countries. The Gulf Cooperation Council believed that the 2011 uprisings grew from the ghost of
the Iranian Revolution. They thought that Iran attempted to capitalize on the popular unrest in
Bahrain to ultimately overrule the Sunni al-Khalifa family power in Bahrain (Friedman 2012). At
the height of Arab Spring protests on March 14th, one day before a three-month state of
emergency was called, at King Hamad’s request, Saudi military transport vehicles and roughly
two thousand troops from the GCC’s Peninsula Shield task force were deployed to support the
al-Khalifa security forces (Bronner and Slackman, 2011). Although the protests were largely
nonviolent, the aftermath of the protests and subsequent crackdown led to over forty people
killed, 1,600 arrested, and many detainees tortured, with several dying while in custody.
Protesters were not the only ones targeted; journalists and doctors were also detained for
reporting on the case and treating the wounded. 4,000 individuals have lost their jobs for
supporting the movement, and forty mosques that have been destroyed (Zunes 2013). Even
though Bahrain requested the deployment of military backing by Saudi forces, the Kingdom’s
presence highlights Saudi concern over Iran’s expanding regional influence, and goes to show

43
that Saudi’s actions are not to help Bahraini people, but rather to help the regional interests of the
Kingdom (Bronner and Slackman 2011).
Media rhetoric also played an active role in rallying Iranians and Saudis around the
situation in Bahrain. The Saudi Daily newspaper Al Jazirah, days before March 14th , released a
weeklong series of articles titled “Safavid Iran’s plans for the destruction of the Gulf States,”
calling back to the Safavid Empire in the sixteenth to eighteenth century, the Shia empire had
control over Bahrain. The articles described Iran’s elaborate plan to exploit chaos in Bahrain in
order to advance its regional ambitions to annex Bahrain as a part of Iran. In addition, Iran’s own
daily newspaper Kayhan published a statement that was endorsed by over two hundred and fifty
members of Parliament, stating “the efforts of America and the sending of forces by the rulers of
Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, the staining of the hands of these rulers with the blood of innocents of
Bahrain not only will not suppress the will of the people of Bahrain, the bloody intervention in
Bahrain by Saudi Arabia will have dangerous consequences for the illegitimate rulers of the
Saudi regime” (Friedman 2012). These two media publications are samples in a broader
collection of reporting that follow the foreign policy stances of Saudi Arabia and Iran. The
Kingdom remains skeptical of its biggest regional counterpart, Iran, and attempts to instill fear of
Iranian proselytization in the smaller Gulf States. Iran, on the other hand, continues to attack
Saudi Arabia, citing the expense of human lives and the illegitimate Saudi elite, while
simultaneously blaming the United States in order to continue its Pan-Islamic and anti-American
foreign policy stance. Saudi Arabia uses sectarianism to redirect any internal or external
disapproval of Saudi military deployment, citing Iran as the inherent regional enemy who is
obsessed with reviving the Safavid Empire. The Iranians, on the other hand, do not refer to
sectarianism as reasoning for delegitimizing foreign governments and calling out against
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intervention in Bahrain. They rather employ a humanitarian stance, which is meant to resound
with Shias because of their shared identity with Bahraini protesters, and should resonate with
non-Shias as well.
Editor-in-chief at the Pan-Arab daily newspaper al-Hayat, reported that the aggressive
stance of the Gulf Cooperation Council was uncharacteristic of the coalition’s previous
approaches to foreign policy, which was usually focused on avoiding condemnation and attacks
and keeping crisis mitigation behind closed doors. Particularly, this silence was seen in the
GCC’s reaction to Iraq, where the council refused to confront Iran on its political entrenchment
(Friedman 2012). However, since the Arab Spring, a distinct shift in the GCC has occurred,
specifically with the reassertion of Saudi dominance, and diminished opposition by Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates. The many and fast uprisings of the Arab Spring produced a new sense of
urgency and required quick, deliberate action to back the otherwise at-risk governments
(Kamrava 2012). The shift in GCC’s foreign policy shows the deep fear member countries feel at
the possibility of an Iranian backed revolution in Bahrain. The continued Saudi leadership in the
GCC further displays how a consistent fear of a more powerful Iran remains today, and has
forced the GCC to reform its foreign policy approach to be more outspoken against Iran’s
actions, with a staunch opposition to possible future Iranian nuclear capabilities, and to act more
proactive and outspoken in their regional endeavors.
Since the end of the Arab Spring, stifling opposition remains a priority on the Bahraini
elite’s agenda. After the lifting of martial law in June 2011, King Hamad created a National
Dialogue and an independent investigation into the unrest. He called this an attempt to reconcile
with the opposition, but the results only led to more divisions between the opposition and
Bahraini leadership in part through mixed messages from regime leadership. Bahrain’s National
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Safety Court tried and sentenced thirteen prominent opposition figures to varying terms of
imprisonment, most of who were committed non-violent protesters (Ulrichsen 2012).
Credibility of King Hamad’s oppositional reconciliation tactics suffered from the
beginning of the post-revolution period. The Bahraini leadership ignored core oppositional
demands, rewriting electoral boundaries and limiting the extent of the al-Khalifa family’s power.
King Hamad also called for the creation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, or
the BICI, to investigate the Arab Spring. The chair, Egyptian Professor Cherif Bassiouni, had led
the UN Security Council investigation into war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. His report
released in November made shocking discoveries. In the report, and during a televised speech in
front of the King, he concluded that state authorities used torture and excessive force during
protest crackdowns, and discovered a pattern of unaccountability and violations of human rights
protection laws in the state emergency security services. Most surprisingly to the Bahrain
leadership and the international community, the BICI argued that the protests were in the
boundaries of citizens’ participatory rights, and that there was no evidence found to link the
protests to Iranian involvement. The statements by the BICI directly contradicted regime
narratives and the GCC’s justification for military intervention, thus creating deeper divisions
between the leadership and the opposition (Bassiouni 2011).
In 2017, Bahrain’s Shura Council, or the Consultative Council approved a constitutional
amendment allowing military courts to try citizens who attack security forces, which Amnesty
International said would undermine defendants’ rights and silence state opposition, and “is part
of a broader pattern where the government uses the courts to crack down on all forms of
opposition at the expense of human rights” (Yaakoubi 2017). Human rights organizations have
been critical of Bahrain’s recent domestic policies that silence Shia oppositions, including arrests
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of several prominent activists and the removal of a Shia spiritual leaders’ citizenship on the basis
of corruption charges (Aboudi and Williams 2017).
Bahrain’s monarchy, however, has promoted the idea of pluralism and religious
toleration, which is used as a counter-narrative campaign to delegitimize widespread majority
Shia sentiments. The King nominated a female member of the Jewish community as Bahraini
ambassador in Washington, who served from 2008-2013, although the Jewish community in
Bahrain is about 35-50 individuals at most. She was promoted the same year the regime released
a document that promoted “harmony and tolerance among religions in Bahrain, the land where
all faiths and sects are respected” (Bahrain News Agency 2008). Representitives from Bohras,
Christian, and Muslim communities sighed the document and and celebrated “freedom of
worship” (Ibid). These gestures, though they received much media attention, were made to
benefit non-citizens, foreign residents, and politically non-oppositional minorities. While
promoting inclusion of religious minorities in Bahrain, in January 2014, the court dissolved the
Shia Islamic Council of Scholars, created in 2004 by Sheikh Issa Qassim, and liquidated its
assets, claiming that the group was breaching laws on permitted political activities (Global
Coalition to Protect Education 2014).
Until the government stops seeing Shias as a political threat, the Bahraini leadership will
continue to marginalize and monitor them. In addition, escalating tensions between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, could lead to deteriorating relations between Bahrain’s leadership and opposition,
where shared regional grievances has the power to mobilize Iranians to proselytize Bahrainis in
the future.
The case of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Bahrain shows how the Saudis and Iranians have
framed the Arab Spring in Bahrain, and the results of their interventions in the region. Although
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the direct intervention of Iran in Bahrain is debated, the Saudis would not have reacted to the
uprising with such forceful military assistance if there were no fear of Iran gaining influence in
the region. However, without GCC military intervention in the uprisings, the outcome of the
Arab Spring in Bahrain could have been drastically different.

Yemen
Yemen is geographically divided with the minority Shias in the northeast and the
majority Sunni populations in the southeast. The oppositional insurgent group known as the
Houthis is Zaidiyyah. It is a small branch of Shias located almost exclusively in Yemen that is
distinct from Twelver Shiism, but is not entirely associated with the Houthi insurgency. The
Houthis fought president Ali Abdullah Saleh from 2004 until 2011, when he stepped down
during the Arab Spring protests and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi succeeded him. Saudi
Arabia supports president Hadi, and believes that military intervention is the solution to restoring
Yemen’s failed government. However, this approach has spiraled them from a proxy war in
Yemen into a wider, more complicated conflict involving many international actors, such as
Egypt’s president Sisi, supporting Hadi’s navy and air forces, and Al Qaeda’s Sunni militants
(NYT 2015).
The Saudis have ties to the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, which emerged in
1962. However, this unity between the Saudis and North Yemen dissolved in 1990 with the
unification of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, or South Yemen, to form the
Republic of Yemen in 1990. The Saudis financially and politically supported North Yemen to
protect it from the Marxist-influenced People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Saudis
campaigned to coerce North Yemen into ignoring any prospects of unification with South
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Yemen, in part because of a fear that, if united, Yemen would become the more populous and
dynamic Arab Peninsula country. Following the brief but bloody civil war in South Yemen in
1986, and the decline of communism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, South Yemen began a
liberalization process simultaneously with North Yemen and the two countries quickly moved
toward unification in 1990 (Phillips 2014).
After failing to prevent the unification between North Yemen and South Yemen, Riyadh
began to place pressure on the newly merged Yemen regime. Especially after Sana’a seemed to
support Iraq in Kuwait in August 1990, Saudi Arabia began a counter-narrative campaign
towards Yemen and expelled Yemeni workers from the Kingdom. This influx of an estimated
one million workers weakened Yemen’s already fragile economy. Relations between Sana’a and
Riyadh further deteriorated with the rise of competition over oil reserves on the established
boarder region between the two countries. Riyadh formed alliances with tribal groups to
periodically kidnap and detain oil-field workers and require Sana’a to meet tribal demands. As a
new government, Sana’a failed to establish control over the Riyadh’s allied tribal groups,
undermining Yemen’s central government. Serving as an even greater challenge to Riyadh,
Sana’a experimented with civic participation and democratic governance systems that Saudi
officials viewed as dubious. Eventually, in 1998, the Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih
declared a border agreement to peacefully settle disputes with the Saudis, with the hope that
cooperation could lead to economic benefits. In addition, the Saudis began building Wahhabi
institutes, particularly in the Sa’ada province, in an attempt to create an allied force in the
country (Juneau 2016). Despite these factors, in the long run, Saudis viewed Yemen as a threat to
their supremacy in the peninsula, and many Yemenis viewed Sana’a’s alliance with Riyadh to be
irresponsible and subservient.
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In November 2011, after high levels of defections and protests, an agreement titled the
GCC Initiative called for numerous quick reforms in Yemen, including elections for a new
president, a government comprised equally of ruling and oppositional party members,
amendments to the electoral system and constitution, and changes to the security apparatus. In
this agreement, President Salih was not required to abandon all positions in politics ; instead he
gained immunity from prosecution for anything he committed while in power and was allowed to
remain as the head of his political party. Many Yemenis saw this process as illegitimate because
it was largely influenced by the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Houthis vehemently
rejected the proposal to form a federation of six regions, which was an obvious tactic to divide
the territories under Houthi control (Juneau 2016). Such political unrest concurring with food
insecurity, an increase in Al-Qaida affiliates in the country and U.S. military action against them,
other security issues, and a decline in oil revenues led to the failed state we see today (Phillips
2014).
Arguably even worse than the United States’ failure to acknowledge Saudi war crimes in
the region, the U.S. has previously provided the Saudis with unchecked military sales for
fighting in Yemen. Approvals of these sales have significantly increased the civilian death toll.
Saudi Arabia’s naval blockade in Aden and al-Hudaydah has cut off essential supplies to
Yemenis and has largely contributed to fatal instability in the country. In April, Riyadh agreed to
provide Yemen with $274 million for humanitarian relief, but has since failed to transfer the
funds. London and Washington have tried to “quietly” persuade the Saudis to moderate its tactics
in Yemen, but so far, Saudi Arabia’s policy has remained the same (Carasik 2015). At the same
time, the United States has provided intelligence and some logistical support to the Saudi-led
coalition of nine African and Middle Eastern countries that launched Operation Decisive Storm
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in March 2015. This action has been responsible for bombing hospitals and weddings, causing
hundreds of civilian causalities, and blockading which cuts off Yemen’s food and medicine
supplies (Knights and Mello 2015). Experts claim, however, that the March 2015 Saudi-led
coalition airstrikes against the Houthis have been carried out despite few new arms support from
the U.S., who have supported the Kingdom with intelligence instead of weaponry. This suggests
that the Kingdom has become capable of carrying out sophisticated military campaigns,
independent of continued aid from the U.S. (Friedman 2015).
Saudi Arabia has used military intervention in Yemen throughout the last five years,
though its level of involvement fluctuates, with the claim that it is protecting the Arab nations
from “Persian subversion” (Milani 2015). This being said, experts have claimed that Saudi
Arabia exaggerates Iran’s influence in Yemen, using this rhetoric as an excuse to justify the
Kingdom’s desire for regional expansion (Juneau 2016; Malsin 2016; Lynch 2016; Terril 2014).
Iran has little economic investment in Yemen. Though Iran has supported the Houthis in the last
few years with soft power and small investments, Mohsen Milani argues that the Houthis are
seeking Iran’s support, whereas Iran is not seeking to reap large benefits from supporting the
Houthis. Evidence suggesting Iran’s modest investment into Yemen can be seen in examinations
of Tehran’s outlook on the conflict in Yemen; Iran states that there is no military solution, and
therefore, unlike the Saudis, Tehran will not directly invest military strength into the broken
country with an unforeseeable future. This, however, does not mean Iran has fully expunged its
Yemen interests; Tehran has realized that it can still make geopolitical gains in the warring
country, with little economic or ideological investments (Milani 2015).
Thomas Juneau claims the Iranians have four reasons for supporting the Houthis over the
past few years in a limited way. First, the high levels of instability in Yemen means that in order
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to substantially benefit in a resolution, Iran would have to heavily commit to the country.
Second, Iran has limited geopolitical gains to make in Yemen, where the country is not as much
of a foreign policy priority as is Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Third, deeper investment into Yemen
would represent international “overstretching” for Iran, thus deflecting resources away from
other regional projects of greater value. Finally, Iran recognizes that Yemen is a large priority for
Saudi Arabia; therefore deeper investment into Yemen would mean further unnecessary
contesting tensions with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, the costs of more involvement outweigh the
benefits (Juneau 2016).
Still, Iranian support of the Houthis has resulted in the marginalization of pro-Saudi
actors in Yemen, such as Ali Mosen the Al-Islah. Accordingly, any losses for the Saudis
represent gains for the Iranians, and Iran benefits from the distraction of Saudi’s investment in
the expensive conflict, thus giving way for insecurity to disperse elsewhere in the region, such as
in Syria and Iraq (Milani 2015).
A presence in Yemen, however marginal, nonetheless creates a launch pad for Iran to use
against any future opponents. Tehran has established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
officers to train and equip the Houthis, and there have been reports of increased shipping
between Iran and Yemen in 2015 (Jones and Kerr 2015). However, with Yemen’s one-of-a-kind
gun culture and its vast preexisting weapons market, any contribution to the plethora of already
available weapons in the country does not necessarily have a lasting impact on the balance of
forces in Yemen, nor does it reap many benefits to the donor. This being said, Iran’s
contributions do not necessarily result in any significant influence over Houthi’s decisions. In a
statement in April 2015, Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the State Department stated, “The U.S. is
concerned about Iran’s relations with the Houthis and that the U.S. has evidence of all kinds of
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support to the Houthis, but, we have no evidence that Iran controls the actions of the Houthis”
(Milani 2015). Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the Houthis are dependent on
Iranian support, or that they are an instrumental actor in the Yemen war.
The Saudis have more to gain from involvement in the Yemen war because of their
previous investments in the country since the mid-twentieth century. From 2012 to 2014, the
Kingdom spent over four billion dollars to support Yemen, and many of its actions in the country
have resulted in increased casualties. (IRIN 2014). Once again, this economic support and
various other interventions in Yemen exemplify the realpolitik of Riyadh. On their southern
border, the Saudis need to continue to dilute tensions in Yemen, which poses an all-too-real
threat to Saudi national security, in the possible influx of refugees, weapons, and Al Qaeda’s
Arabian Peninsula branch.
Today, to simplify, conflict in Yemen divides Houthis, Iran, and former president Saleh
on one side, versus the pro-status quo forces of the remaining Hadi government, its domestic
backing, and Saudi Arabia. Looking at the conflict holistically, though, the situation in Yemen
involves far more actors, and has turned from a civil war into an international crisis. Although
the Houthis are one of the many problematic groups in Yemen, the Saudis have targeted the
group as if it is the sole actor responsible for the state of anarchy in Yemen. Even though this is
not the case, the stance is in line with Saudi policy in regional conflicts. Riyadh believes that its
influence in Yemen is necessary as an extension of its efforts to counter Iranian influence in the
region. Saudi Arabia considers the Houthis to be an Iranian proxy, although, as stated before,
Tehran’s influence in Yemen is marginal, both economically and politically. Without Saudi
influence in Yemen, however, the country has a high chance of completely imploding on itself
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(Knickmeyer 2011). The Saudis are not trying to solve the conflict in Yemen or find a long-term
solution; they are only trying to manage the existing problem.
Since the unification of North and South Yemen, the Saudis have tried to undermine the
new country, but since the war, Riyadh is trying a different approach to ensure a pro-Saudi force
emerges from the war. The Saudis instituted economic measures to manipulate Yemen’s oil
market and prevented Yemenis from working in the Kingdom. In addition, they created a
division between the tribal groups on the Saudi-Yemen boarder and the state. Retracting from the
crisis in Yemen would mean over fifty years of wasted national interest efforts. Continued
involvement in Yemen, on the other hand, means continued protection of Saudi national
interests. If Yemen implodes after Saudi withdrawal, the legitimacy of the Kingdom would come
into question, both domestically internationally. However, currently, the Saudi narrative for
involvement in Yemen is framed around a defensive campaign against the Iranians.
The complexity of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen does not have a high chance of
resolution in the foreseeable future. Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni analyst at the Carnagie Middle
East Center claims, “’for peace to possibly exist in Yemen, it will have to get at least the
consensus of at least Saudi Arabia and Iran.’” (Malsin 2016). Saudi involvement in Yemen is
seen as a foreign policy failure, and has received resistance from Saudi society and the
international community. For this reason, Riyadh may choose to fizzle out its presence in the
country and divert its attention toward other regional concerns, such as advocacy against the
Iranian nuclear deal. This, however, could leave a vacuum for other non-state actors, such as Al
Qaeda, to capture the region, or for Iran to gain more leverage. In addition, Al Qaeda entering
Saudi Arabia would significantly delegitimize the Kingdom in the eyes of the international
community because Saudi Wahhabi proselytization in Yemen has influenced the establishment
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of Islamist groups. Saudi Arabia’s failed foreign intervention in Yemen, which has only
exacerbated the conflict, can hopefully serve as a reminder for the country to carefully weigh
Iranian involvement in future regional crises before establishing an active role.

Future Prospects for Bahrain and Yemen
The futures of Bahrain and Yemen have been dramatically altered by Saudi and Iranian
intervention. If Bahrain’s leadership continues to uphold and implement laws in the country that
marginalize Shias, its actions could lead to a widespread feeling of disillusionment amongst
majority of the population, leading to a dispirited society that could turn to Iran for help.
Likewise, Bahrain cannot rely on the Saudi’s checkbook diplomacy and protection in the case of
future civil uprisings because it then runs the risk of becoming an absolute Saudi satellite.
Bahrain has carefully investigated its Arab Spring protests and should use the analysis to create a
more inclusive public atmosphere, instead of further instigating civil society, which could only
lead to more civil unrest. In Yemen, the Saudis continue to be actively involved, although the
country has reached an impasse. Because the Kingdom has not made any tangible gains in
Yemen, the legitimacy and coercive power of the state will be undermined if it fully retracts
itself from Yemen. However, as oil becomes a less lucrative market, the Saudis and Iranians will
need to become more selective in the conflicts in which they choose to intervene. This possible
future financial crisis serves as an incentive for the Saudis, particularly, to gracefully and
creatively back out of its international conflicts from which they have yet to reap benefits, rather
than continuing to divert their revenue away from domestic projects.
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Conclusion

The Middle East is currently experiencing a leadership duality. This paper has argued that
the actions of Saudi and Iranian leadership are largely due neither to sectarian differences nor to
caprice, but rather that both countries adhere to realpolitik and ideological strategies in regional
policymaking. Although both countries have policies discriminating against the other religious
sect, Riyadh mainly frames regional conflicts around Iranian aggression, which has become
ubiquitous with Shia aggression, whereas Tehran places blame on American perversion rather
than overtly Sunni or Saudi influence.
Circumstances in Bahrain and Yemen suggest that the Saudis not only have greater
investments in these two proxy wars than the Iranians do, but they also inflate the level of Iranian
involvement in order to delegitimize Tehran and unite Saudi nationals around Riyadh’s proxy
wars. It is uncertain whether this narrative is a result of genuine paranoia of Iranian subversion,
or if it is a disguise to move attention away from Saudi actions. The case of Bahrain seems to
suggest the Saudi vigilance towards Iran is rather genuine. Involvement in Yemen, however, was
justified similarly as a national security measure against Iranian proselytization, which actually
concealed the real goal of preventing Islamist threats from entering the Kingdom, in order to
protect Saudi legitimacy.
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s desire for geopolitical supremacy has become a national security
objective for the two countries. When it comes to the national security of Saudi Arabia and Iran,
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the regimes have largely invested resources abroad, while resorting to an internal security quick
fix involving systemic alienation of minority Muslim populations, who they see as a political
threat. This suppression of perceived domestic threats only delays any possible future opposition
against the regime, adding pressure to the autoclave. As an alternative, the countries could
diffuse this pressure by taking steps to build dialogues and institute social and economic reforms
to include the entire populations.
When it comes to civil unrest, these countries, along with others, historically have
mitigated political unrest and disapproval with increased public spending packages. This
strategy, though not capable of providing for prolonged peace, can help, so long as there are
remittances and funding within the government. Proxy wars deplete state funds, particularly for
the Saudis, who have no foreseeable future solutions in Yemen. Investing in more egalitarian
policies, rather than investing in suppressive projects, will better create functioning and diverse
societies and economies. This is a wiser national security strategy that will, in the long run,
benefit the home countries.
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